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ABSTRACT
By delegating path control to end-hosts, future Internet architec-
tures oer exibility for path selection. However, there is a concern
that the distributed routing decisions by end-hosts, in particular
load-adaptive routing, can lead to oscillations if path selection is
performed without coordination or accurate load information. Prior
research has addressed this problem by devising path-selection poli-
cies that lead to stability. However, little is known about the viability
of these policies in the Internet context, where selsh end-hosts
can deviate from a prescribed policy if such a deviation is benecial
from their individual perspective. In order to achieve network sta-
bility in future Internet architectures, it is essential that end-hosts
have an incentive to adopt a stability-oriented path-selection policy.
In this work, we perform the rst incentive analysis of the
stability-inducing path-selection policies proposed in the literature.
Building on a game-theoretic model of end-host path selection,
we show that these policies are in fact incompatible with the self-
interest of end-hosts, as these strategies make it worthwhile to
pursue an oscillatory path-selection strategy. Therefore, stability
in networks with selsh end-hosts must be enforced by incentive-
compatible mechanisms. We present two such mechanisms and
formally prove their incentive compatibility.
1 INTRODUCTION
The past 20 years of research on next-generation Internet architec-
tures have shown the benets of path awareness and path control
for end-hosts, and multiple path-aware network architectures have
been proposed. Many of these architectures, including RON [2],
Platypus [29], MIRO [38], Pathlets [16], Segment Routing [10], and
SCION [3], allow end-hosts to select the inter-domain paths over
which their data packets are forwarded. One principal argument
for such path control is that it enables load-adaptive routing, i.e.,
allows the end-hosts to avoid congested links, and should therefore
lead to a relatively even trac distribution. However, load-adaptive
routing creates new challenges, in particular the introduction of in-
stabilities under certain conditions. Instability due to load-adaptive
routing typically appears in the form of oscillations, i.e., periodic
up- and downswings of link utilization, leading to a large variance
of the trac load in a short time span. According to the IETF, a
central obstacle to deployment of path-aware network architec-
tures are ‘oscillations based on feedback loops, as hosts move from
path to path’ [6]. Indeed, such oscillations can be shown to occur
if path-selection decisions are taken on the basis of outdated load
information [14, 35], which is the case in any real system.
Such oscillations are undesirable for many reasons, both from
the perspective of the end-hosts and the perspective of the network
operator. If oscillation occurs when a link is near its capacity limit,
there is a danger of queue build-up, jitter, and, as a result, unpre-
dictable performance. Moreover, oscillation temporarily leads to a
heavily skewed load distribution over paths, causing higher overall
queuing latency than with a more equal trac distribution. Due to
the large variance of the load level over time, network operators
have to perform substantial overprovisioning of link capacities,
which is undesirable from a business perspective. Moreover, os-
cillation of inter-domain trac imposes additional overhead for
intra-domain trac engineering (e.g., MPLS circuit setup), as oscil-
lating inter-domain ows may constantly switch between inter-AS
interfaces. From the end-host perspective, oscillation causes packet
loss and thus forces the congestion-control algorithms to recurring
restarts, negatively aecting throughput.
To avoid these damaging eects, researchers have devised numer-
ous schemes that aim to guarantee stability of load-adaptive routing.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no scheme so far has aimed
at providing stability in Internet architectures with end-host path
control. Many systems have been designed under the assumption
of network-based path selection, i.e., hop-by-hop forwarding ac-
cording to decisions taken by intermediate routers [11, 17, 23, 25].
These systems achieve convergence by appropriately adjusting how
much trac is forwarded to each next hop towards a destination
and cannot be used if packets must be sent along paths selected
by end-hosts. Other systems allow end-point path selection, but
are targeted to an intra-domain context where the end-points (typi-
cally ingress and egress routers) are under the control of a network
operator [7, 14, 20–22, 27]. In an intra-domain context, network
operators are able to prescribe arbitrary path-selection procedures
that generate stability. Conversely, in an inter-domain context, the
end-points are not under control of network operators and can
thus not be forced to adopt a non-oscillatory path-selection strat-
egy. Instead, as end-hosts must be assumed to be selsh, they can
only be expected to adopt path-selection strategies that optimize
performance from their individual perspective.
By performing a game-theoretic analysis, we show in this paper
that the non-oscillatory path-selection strategies traditionally pro-
posed in the literature on stable source routing [7, 14, 20–22, 27]
are incompatible with the self-interest of end-hosts. Assuming
that such non-oscillatory path-selection strategies are universally
adopted, an end-host can increase its utility by deviating in favor
of a strategy that is oscillatory. Therefore, stability of load-adaptive
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
12
10
5v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 25
 Se
p 2
02
0
IFIP Performance, November 2–6, 2020, Milano, Italy Simon Scherrer, Markus Legner, Adrian Perrig, and Stefan Schmid
routing in an inter-domain context cannot be achieved by relying
only on end-point path selection. Instead, network operators have
to incentivize end-hosts to adopt one of the well-known conver-
gent path-selection strategies with stabilization mechanisms. These
mechanisms have to be incentive-compatible, i.e., the mechanisms
must create an incentive structure such that it is in an end-host’s
self-interest to adopt a non-oscillatory path-selection strategy. In
this work, we present two such stabilization mechanisms, FLOSS
and CROSS, and formally prove their incentive compatibility. These
mechanisms employ dierent techniques to disincentivize oscilla-
tory switching between paths, namely limiting the migration rate
between paths (FLOSS) and imposing a cost on switching between
paths (CROSS). To complement our mainly theoretical work, we
also discuss how our ndings could be practically applied.
1.1 Contribution
This paper revisits the theoretical study of the dynamic eects of
end-point path selection, for the rst time focusing the analysis
on inter-domain networks where the end-points are selsh and
uncontrolled. We present a game-theoretic model that allows us
to investigate which path-selection strategies will be adopted by
selsh end-hosts. In particular, we introduce the notion of equi-
libria to path-selection strategies (PSS equilibria). Moreover, we
formally show that the non-oscillatory path-selection strategies
proposed in the existing literature do not form such PSS equilibria.
Thus, we provide evidence towards the hypothesis that stability in
load-adaptive routing over multiple domains cannot be achieved by
exclusively relying on end-hosts’ path-selection behavior. To rem-
edy this problem, we leverage insights from mechanism design to
devise two incentive-compatible stabilization mechanisms enforced
by network operators. While these mechanisms build on existing
insights from intra-domain trac engineering, their methods of
incentivization represent a novel approach to achieve stability in
inter-domain networks with load-adaptive routing. We formally
prove the incentive compatibility of both mechanisms and discuss
their practical application.
2 OSCILLATION MODEL
2.1 Parallel-Path Systems
In order to study oscillation in network architectures with end-host
path selection, we build on the well-established Wardrop model [37],
which is the standard model for studying the interactions of selsh
agents in computer networks [28, 32, 33]. In the Wardrop model,
an innite number of end-hosts, each controlling an innitesimal
trac share, select one path pi among multiple paths Π between
two network nodes. Every path pi has a load-dependent cost, where
the path-cost function cpi is typically interpreted as latency. The
end-hosts’ path-selection decisions form a congestion game, where
the path-selection decisions of end-hosts both determine and follow
the load fpi on every path pi [5, 19, 30].
In this work, we analyze congestion games with a temporal com-
ponent, i.e., end-hosts take path-selection decisions over time based
on currently available information. More precisely, an end-host
performs an average of r > 0 re-evaluations per unit of time. The
aggregate re-evaluation behavior is uniform over time, i.e., when
dividing time into intervals of length ϵ ∈ (0, 1], rϵ re-evaluations
are performed in any interval
Whenever an end-host performs a re-evaluation, it chooses one
path pi to its destination according to a freely chosen path-selection
strategy σ . We thus formalize the environment of congestion games
as parallel-path systems:
Denition 2.1. A parallel-path system O := (Π, r ,p,T ,A0,v)
is a tuple, where a total demand normalized to 1 is distributed over
parallel paths pi ∈ Π among which end-hosts can select; r > 0
is the average number of re-evaluations per end-host and unit of
time; p ≥ 1 is the steepness of the path cost as a function of the
load (i.e., cpi = (fpi )p ); T ≥ 0 is the average time that it takes for
cost information to reach the agents; A0 ∈ [0, 1] |Π | is the initial
load matrix, where the entry A0pi = fpi (0); and v is the strategy
prole, dening for every available path-selection strategy σ the
share v(σ ) of end-hosts that permanently apply strategy σ .
Every congestion game possesses at least one Wardrop equilib-
rium, consisting of a trac distribution where no single agent can
reduce its cost by selecting an alternative path [30]. If the agents
take path-selection decisions based on up-to-date cost information
of paths (T = 0), convergence to Wardrop equilibria is guaranteed
and persistent oscillations can thus not arise [12, 13, 34]. However,
in practice, the cost information possessed by agents is stale (T > 0),
i.e., the information describes an older state of the network. If such
stale information is present, undesirable oscillations can arise [14].
Therefore, parallel-path systems can be oscillation-prone:
Denition 2.2. A parallel-path system O is oscillation-prone if
and only if T > 0.
In this work, we study oscillation-prone systems with two paths
α and β (i.e., |Π | = 2), but our insights directly generalize to more
paths. Due to total demand normalization, it holds that fβ (t) =
1 − fα (t) for all t ≥ 0. Thus, the unique Wardrop equilibrium in
a two-path oscillation-prone system is given by fα = fβ = 1/2.
Moreover, we assume w.l.o.g. that the initial imbalance A0 exists
with the higher load on path α : fα (0) = A0 = A0α > 1/2. For this
system of two parallel paths, p˜i denotes the respective other path,
i.e., α˜ = β and β˜ = α .
Having introduced the concept of oscillation-prone systems, we
next dene notions of oscillation and stability. First, an oscillation-
prone system experiences oscillation if the trac distribution does
not eventually become static:
Denition 2.3. An oscillation-prone system O experiences oscil-
lation if there exists no limit ∆∗ of the function ∆(t) = | fα (t) −
fβ (t)| for t →∞.
Conversely, we understand stability simply as the absence of
oscillation, i.e., stability is given if a limit ∆∗ exists. However,
to ensure optimal network utilization, the desirable state of the
network is not only stability, but stability at equal load as given by
the Wardrop equilibrium:
Denition 2.4. An oscillation-prone systemO is stable at equal
load if ∆∗ := limt→∞ ∆(t) = 0.
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2.2 Path-Selection Strategies
In a congestion game, end-hosts select paths according to freely
adopted path-selection strategies. In order to enable a theoretical
treatment, we follow Fischer and Vöcking [14] in assuming that
path-selection strategies are memory-less, i.e., not dependent on
anything else than currently observable information. Therefore,
any path-selection strategy σ can be fully characterized by two
elements, σ = (R,u), which we will describe in the following.
First, every strategy is characterized by the expected time R
between re-evaluations of an end-host. The expected re-evaluation
period R reects the reallocation behavior of end-hosts that non-
deterministically re-evaluate the costs of path options, decide for
one option based on the perceived costs, and keep sending on the
selected path until the next re-evaluation is due. The expected
re-evaluation period R has to be in accordance with the parameter
r of the parallel-path system, which describes the average number
of re-evaluations per end-host and unit of time. Hence, R = 1/r .
Second, every strategy σ is based on a path-selection function
u(pi , t | pi ′), which gives the probability for selecting path pi at
time t if the currently used path is pi ′. Given universal adoption
of a strategy σ and rϵ re-evaluations per interval of length ϵ , the
number of end-hosts on path pi changes by the amount ∆ϵ fpi (t) =
−rϵ · u(p˜i , t | pi ) · fpi (t) + rϵ · u(pi , t | p˜i ) · fp˜i (t) within an interval
starting at time t , given a two-path system. If ϵ is chosen to be
innitesimal, we obtain the rate of change:
∂ fpi (t)
∂t
= lim
ϵ→0
∆ϵ fpi (t)
ϵ
= − r · u(p˜i , t | pi ) · fpi (t)
+ r · u(pi , t | p˜i ) · fp˜i (t)
(1)
Throughout the rest of the paper, we describe oscillation dynamics
by such dierential equations.
An example of a path-selection strategy is the greedy path-
selection strategy σg, which selects the path perceived as cheaper:
ug(pi , t | p˜i ) =
{
1 if cpi (t −T ) < cp˜i (t −T )
0 otherwise
(2)
Conversely, the probability of staying on a path is ug(p˜i , t | p˜i ) =
1 − ug(pi , t | p˜i ). At time t , the number of end-hosts on a more
expensive path pi thus changes with rate −r · fpi (t).
Whether an oscillation-prone system in fact experiences oscil-
lation entirely depends on the path-selection strategies adopted
by end-hosts. In the next section, we present the example of an
oscillation-prone system that experiences oscillation for some path-
selection strategy, but converges to stability for a dierent strategy.
2.3 Example of Oscillation
For every T > 0, oscillation occurs in a system in which all agents
adopt a greedy path-selection strategy σg presented in the previous
section. The dynamics of a system with universal adoption of the
greedy strategy are given by the partial dierential equation:1
∂ fα (t)
∂t
=

−r · fα (t) if cα (t −T ) > cβ (t −T )
r · fβ (t) if cα (t −T ) < cβ (t −T )
0 otherwise
(3)
1An analogous equation holds for fβ .
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Figure 1: Oscillation structure for oscillation-prone system
O =
({α , β}, r = 0.3,p ≥ 1,T = 2,A0 = A,v = {σg 7→ 1}) . A and
W are calculated according to Equation (6).
We henceforth refer to turning points as all points in time t+ where
cα (t+ −T ) = cβ (t+ −T ), as fα (t) switches between increasing and
decreasing at these moments, and write t+(t) for the most recent
turning point t+ < t .
Solving the dierential equation piece-wise yields the following
recursive function:2
fα (t) =
{
e−r ·(t−t+(t )) · fα (t+(t)) if fα (t −T ) ≥ 12
1 − e−r ·(t−t+(t )) · fβ (t+(t)) otherwise
(4)
Since T is constant, fα (t) is periodic after the rst turning point
t+1 irrespective of the initial imbalanceA0. Therefore, the oscillation
can be described by the non-recursive function:
fα (t) =
{
e−r ·(t−t+(t )) · A if t+(t )W is even,
1 − e−r ·(t−t+(t )) · A otherwise, (5)
where
W =
ln(2erT − 1)
r
, A = 1 − 1
2erT
, (6)
and t+(t) = t − (t modW ) is a multiple of W . Figure 1 shows
an example of fα (t) for the oscillation-prone system O =
(
Π =
{α , β}, r = 0.3,p ≥ 1,T = 2,A0 = A,v = {σg 7→ 1}
)
, where
A0 has been chosen as A in order to skip the irregular starting
phase. Figure 1 also highlights the time interval during which
path α is the cheaper path (in green, between t∗1 and t
∗
2 ) and the
time interval during which path α is perceived to be the cheaper
path (in red, between t+1 and t
+
2 ). Clearly, the discrepancy between
reality and perception of path costs is the source of oscillation, as
the discrepancy leads to increasing load on a path even when it is
no longer the cheaper path (i.e., between t∗2 and t
+
2 ). Due to the
periodicity of this phenomenon, there exists no limit ∆∗ of load
dierence and the oscillation-prone system experiences oscillation.
An interesting observation is that both amplitude (A) and oscillation
period (2W ) increase with the staleness of the information (T ); any
T > 0 leads to oscillations, only T = 0 ensures stability.
2In the two-path system, fα ≥ 12 is equivalent to cα ≥ cβ .
3
IFIP Performance, November 2–6, 2020, Milano, Italy Simon Scherrer, Markus Legner, Adrian Perrig, and Stefan Schmid
In contrast, if the strategy prole v contains dierent path-
selection strategies, an oscillation-prone system may experience
stability (cf. example in Appendix A).
2.4 Equilibria on Path-Selection Strategies
In general, Nash equilibria refer to strategy proles that do not
allow for benecial selsh strategy changes by individual agents.
In the context of path-selection strategies, a Nash equilibrium is
thus given if every end-host cannot improve its utility by switching
to an alternative path-selection strategy. More formally, a Nash
equilibrium on path-selection strategies can be dened as follows:
Denition 2.5. A strategy prole v∗ is a Nash equilibrium on
path-selection strategies (PSS equilibrium) in an oscillation-prone
system O = (Π, r ,p,T ,A0,v∗) if and only if all strategies σ with
v∗(σ ) > 0 have cost C(σ | O) = C∗ and all strategies σ ′ with
v∗(σ ′) = 0 have cost C(σ ′ | O) ≥ C∗.
It remains to formally dene the cost C(σ | O) of a strategy σ in
an oscillation-prone system O with global strategy prole v . First,
we note that a global strategy prole v , together with an initial
strategy-adoption distribution for each path, uniquely denes the
ow dynamics f (t) = (fα (t), fβ (t)) in oscillation-prone systems
with two paths. As the ow share controlled by each agent is
assumed to be negligible in the Wardrop model, the ow dynam-
ics f (t) are not aected by the choice of σ when varying σ for a
single agent. The basic costs of the two path options α and β at any
moment t are thus given by cα (t) and cβ (t), both uniquely dened
by an oscillation-prone system O = (Π, r ,p,T ,A0,v).
Given expected re-evaluation periods of duration R, an end-host
deciding for path pi at time t incurs the usage cost
cu(pi , t) = 1
R
∫ t+R
t
cpi (s) ds . (7)
At time t , the cost c(σ , t) of applying a strategy σ is
c(σ , t |pi ′) =
∑
pi ∈Π
u(pi , t | pi ′) · cu(pi , t), (8)
where pi ′ is the current path of the end-host before the decision at
time t and u(pi , t | pi ′) is the probability that path pi is selected at
time t given the current path pi ′.
Furthermore, the strategy also determines the probability dis-
tribution y(pi ′ | t) that denes the probability of the current path
being pi ′ at time t . The expected cost for applying a strategy σ at
time t is thus given as follows:
C(σ , t) =
∑
pi ′∈Π
y(pi ′ | t) · c(σ , t | pi ′) (9)
The expected cost of applying a strategy σ in general can be
derived as the average time-dependent strategy cost during a certain
relevant time span
[
t0, t1
]
:
C(σ | O) = 1
t1 − t0
∫ t1
t0
C(σ , t) dt (10)
For systems that converge to stability at equal load, the relevant
time span extends from t0 = 0 until time tδ when the system has
converged according to some criterion δ > 0, i.e., ∀t > tδ . ∆(t) < δ .
The time after convergence does not have to be considered as all
strategies have the same cost for a system with equal path costs.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
t
0.00
0.25
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0.75
1.00
f α
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µ = 0.1
µ = 0.5
µ = 1.0
Figure 2: Dynamics produced by universal adoption of strat-
egy σc with dierent µ in oscillation-prone system O =
({α , β}, r = 1,p = 1,T = 2,A0 = 1,v = {σc 7→ 1}).
For periodic oscillating systems, the relevant time span is dened as
every interval that contains the periodically repeated sub-function.
For an example of a PSS equilibrium analysis, see Appendix B.
3 LIMITS OF STABLE STRATEGIES
In this section, we investigate whether the stability-inducing path-
selection strategies proposed in the literature form PSS equilibria.
The question is whether an end-host can minimize its cost with a
stability-oriented strategy if that strategy is universally adopted.
We perform this investigation by means of two case studies. In
§3.1, we analyze the convergent rerouting policies designed by
Fischer and Vöcking [14] and show that such rerouting policies
are not compatible with the selshness of end-hosts. In §3.2, we
analyze the MATE algorithm [7] and show its equivalence to the
rerouting policies discussed in §3.1.
3.1 Rerouting Policies by Fischer & Vöcking
A typical example of a convergent path-selection strategy has been
proposed by Fischer and Vöcking [14]. The proposed path-selection
strategy, which we henceforth refer to as the convergent strategy
σc, works as follows: If an end-host discovers a path with lower cost
according to stale information, the end-host switches to that path
with a probability that is a linear function of the perceived latency
dierence. More formally, the probability u(pi , t | p˜i ) to switch from
path pit to path pi , p˜i at time t is:
u(pi , t | p˜i ) =
{
µ · cp˜i (t−T )−cpi (t−T )∆max if cpi (t −T ) < cp˜i (t −T ),
0 otherwise,
(11)
Here, µ is a parameter in [0, 1] and the latency dierence is
normalized by ∆max, which is 1 in parallel-path systems as dened
in §2.1. The dynamics of a two-path oscillation-prone system where
strategy σc is universally adopted can thus be described by the
delay-dierential equation (DDE)
∂ fα
∂t
=
{
r · µ · ∆c(t −T ) · fα (t) if ∆c(t −T ) ≤ 0,
r · µ · ∆c(t −T ) · fβ (t) otherwise,
(12)
where ∆c(t − T ) = cβ (t − T ) − cα (t − T ). This DDE describes a
damped oscillator with delayed feedback and does not have an
explicit solution [4]. However, we can numerically compute a
solution using the method of steps [8].
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As Figure 2 shows, the choice of the parameter µ is critical for the
strategy to actually lead to convergence. For high values of µ, such
as 1, the strategy fails to produce convergence and yields undamped
periodic oscillations. For low values of µ, such as 0.1, the system
monotonically approaches the equilibrium without overshooting,
i.e., it is overdamped (or, if nearly avoiding overshooting, critically
damped). For values in-between, such as 0.5, the system eventually
converges to stability at equal load, but only after overshooting,
i.e., it is underdamped. However, for both the overdamped and the
underdamped convergent strategies, we can make the following
observation:
Observation 1. Universal adoption of the convergent path-selection
strategy σc does not represent a PSS equilibrium, neither in its under-
damped nor in its overdamped variant.
In the case of the overdamped strategy (e.g., σc with µ = 0.1), the
link loads monotonically approach each other and thus the greedy
strategy allows an end-host to make use of a cheaper path sooner,
making it the best-response strategy given universal adoption of σc.
In the case of the underdamped convergent strategy (e.g., σc with
µ = 0.5), the fact that the strategy is not a PSS equilibrium in
general is not obvious. However, we can show that there exist
alternative strategies to the underdamped rerouting policy that
reduce a deviant agent’s cost, see Appendix C.
3.2 MATE Algorithm
The MATE algorithm [7] was designed for the intra-domain context,
where an ingress router has to distribute its demand d between
multiple label-switched paths to a given egress router. As these
ingress routers are under control of the domain operator, the MATE
algorithm pursues convergence to the socially optimal trac distri-
bution, which minimizes latency from a global perspective, but is
generally unstable given selsh end-hosts. In the context of inter-
domain networks, the MATE algorithm is instantiated such that it
converges to a Wardrop equilibrium, a type of equilibrium that is
stable under the assumption of selsh agents.
We analyze whether applying the MATE algorithm is rational
from an end-host’s perspective. An end-host in an oscillation-prone
two-path system would execute the MATE algorithm as follows.
In every re-evaluation, the end-host selshly optimizes its trac
allocation
(
Fα , Fβ
)>, where Fα = d − Fβ . In order to conform
to the Wardrop model, the demand d is negligible from a global
perspective. A MATE optimization step is dened as follows:(
F ′α
F ′β
)
=
[(
Fα
Fβ
)
− γ ·
(
cα (t −T )
cβ (t −T )
)]+
(13)
In order to reach convergence despite stale information, the coe-
cientγ has to conform to a certain upper bound [7]. Moreover,
[
F
]+
represents a projection of allocation vector F to the feasible alloca-
tion set dened by Fα + Fβ = d with Fα , Fβ ≥ 0.
As we show in Appendix D, the dynamics of an oscillation-
prone system with universal adoption of the MATE algorithm are
described by the following dierential equation:
∂ fα
∂t
=
{
r · γ2 · ∆(t −T ) · fα (t) if ∆(t −T ) ≤ 0
r · γ2 · ∆(t −T ) · fβ (t) otherwise
(14)
This equation is clearly equivalent to Equation (12) for a choice of
µ = γ/2. An oscillation-prone system with universal adoption of
σc and a system with universal adoption of the MATE algorithm
thus exhibit the same ow dynamics, which allow for benecial
deviation:
Observation 2. The path-selection strategy as prescribed by the
MATE algorithm is equivalent to the path-selection strategy σc. Thus,
universal adoption of the MATE algorithm neither constitutes a PSS
equilibrium.
3.3 Conclusion
In summary, the kind of convergent path-selection strategies pro-
posed in the literature cannot be assumed to be adopted by selsh
end-hosts, as deviating from these strategies (e.g., by switching
faster than prescribed by the strategy) is benecial to an end-host.
Stability in a path-aware network architecture with selsh end-
hosts can thus not be guaranteed by non-oscillatory path-selection
strategies that prescribe a maximum rate of change to be respected
by end-hosts. Instead, the network could employ mechanisms that
incentivize end-hosts to follow non-oscillatory path-selection strate-
gies. This nding reects a similar result [1, 15] in the context of
congestion control, namely that socially desirable behavior of end-
hosts can only be enforced with network support.
4 STABILIZATION MECHANISMS
As argued in the previous section, rational end-hosts in networks
with unrestricted path choice are unlikely to adopt convergent
path-selection strategies. Therefore, there is a need for mecha-
nisms that allow network operators to incentivize the adoption
of path-selection strategies that induce stability at equal load, i.e.,
incentive-compatible stabilization mechanisms. First, we integrate
the concept of trac-steering mechanisms into our game-theoretic
model (§4.1). Second, we specify in §4.2 the conditions under which
these mechanisms are incentive-compatible.
4.1 Trac-Steering Mechanisms
In order to aect the path-selection decisions of end-hosts in an
oscillation-prone system O , a trac-steering mechanismM needs
to alter the strategy cost C(σ |O) for at least one path-selection
strategy σ . A mechanismM thus denes a function cM (pi , t) that
quanties the mechanism-imposed cost for using path pi at time t .
This cost is imposed onto the user of a path pi in addition to the
load-dependent path cost.
If a mechanism M is active, the usage cost cMu extends the
standard usage cost cu from Equation (7) as follows:
cMu (pi , t) = cu(pi , t) + cM (pi , t) (15)
The cost formulas cM (pi , t |p˜i ), CM (σ , t), and CM (σ |O) can be con-
structed from cMu (pi , t), analogously to §2.4.
4.2 Incentive Compatibility
In general, incentive-compatible mechanisms are mechanisms that
incentivize a certain form of desirable behavior. In our context, we
consider trac-steering mechanisms to be incentive-compatible
if these mechanisms incentivize the desirable behavior of adopt-
ing a non-oscillatory path-selection strategy. In other words, an
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Figure 3: Simulation of FLOSS enforcement in an oscillation-
prone system O = (Π = {α , β}, r = 1,p = 1,T = 2,A0 = 1,v =
{σF 7→ 1}).
incentive-compatible mechanism creates a PSS equilibrium, i.e., a
situation where every end-host minimizes its cost by adopting a
non-oscillatory path-selection strategy, given that all other end-
hosts do so:
Denition 4.1. A trac-steeringmechanismM is an incentive-
compatible stabilization mechanism for an oscillation-prone sys-
tem O if there is a strategy prole v∗ such that
(i) v∗ leads to stability at equal load and
(ii) v∗ represents a PSS equilibrium with respect to the cost func-
tion CM (σ |O).
In the following two sections, we present two instances of stabi-
lization mechanisms, namely FLOSS and CROSS, and prove their
incentive compatibility. The two mechanisms dier in the meth-
ods for achieving stability: Whereas FLOSS reduces the imbalance
between two paths by regulating the migration rate between the
paths, CROSS achieves stability by repetitive reshuing of ows
between paths and increasing the cost of path migration.
5 THE FLOSS MECHANISM
In this section, we present the FLOSS mechanism (Flow-Loyalty
Oscillation-Suppression System).
5.1 Overview
As shown in §3, convergent path-selection strategies are character-
ized by careful path-switching behavior: An end-host only switches
to a seemingly cheaper path with a modest probability that depends
on the measured latency dierence, translating into a relatively low
migration rate between paths. It is well known that system stability
can be achieved by by limiting the rate of change (also known as
the system gain [22]). However, the challenge is to develop meth-
ods that achieve this change-rate limitation in the face of selsh,
uncontrolled end-hosts. Such a method is given by FLOSS.
As selsh end-hosts do not voluntarily conform to a modest
path-migration rate, the path-migration rate has to be regulated by
network operators. The FLOSS mechanism performs such regula-
tion by rewarding end-hosts that are loyal to a certain path and by
restricting arbitrary path migration by oscillating end-hosts.
In order to regulate path migration, the FLOSS mechanism makes
use of registrations and proceeds in intervals. Figure 3, which shows
a simulation of the FLOSS mechanism in a two-path system, il-
lustrates the FLOSS approach. Initially, the FLOSS mechanism
announces at time t ′ that all end-hosts are required to obtain a
registration for one path pi of their choice. This registration allows
an end-host to use path pi during a future time interval I0 = [t0, t1)
with t ′ < t0 < t0 + T < t1. End-hosts that use path pi without a
registration are punished in the interval (e.g., by dropping packets).
This call for registration produces a distribution of ows over
the two paths, which is stable during the interval as no end-host
can switch to the path which it is not registered for. However,
this load distribution is unlikely to be perfectly equal. The FLOSS
mechanism iteratively reduces this imbalance: In every following
time interval, a small set of ows are allowed to migrate from
the more expensive path to the cheaper path. This allowance is
enforced by selectively granting registrations: Whereas end-hosts
with a pre-existing registration for a path (loyal end-hosts) always
obtain a registration for that path, end-hosts without a pre-existing
registration are not always allowed to register. Once the imbalance
is suciently small, the end-hosts do not have an incentive anymore
to switch paths, at which point the enforcement of the mechanism
can be suspended (e.g., at the end of interval I2 in Figure 3).
Theorem 5.1. The FLOSS mechanism is an incentive-compatible
stabilization mechanism.
As dened in §4.2, incentive compatibility implies the existence
of a strategy prole that leads to stability at equal load and is a
PSS equilibrium during mechanism enforcement. For FLOSS, such
a strategy prole is given by universal adoption of the FLOSS-
compliant path-selection strategy σF. The strategy σF prescribes to
use the path with the lowest expected cost which the end-host is
entitled to use. Our incentive-compatibility proof thus builds on
the following two concrete lemmas, which are proved in §5.2 and
§5.3, respectively:
Lemma 5.2. Universal adoption of the FLOSS path-selection strat-
egy σF leads to stability at equal load.
Lemma 5.3. Universal adoption of the FLOSS path-selection strat-
egy σF represents a PSS equilibrium during enforcement of the FLOSS
mechanism.
5.2 Stability Analysis
In order to prove Theorem 5.2, we assume universal adoption of
path-selection strategy σF, i.e., an end-host always uses the path
with the lower expected cost provided that the end-host is entitled
to use that path.
When registering before the initial interval, all end-hosts simul-
taneously decide for one path to use during the upcoming interval
[t0, t1). Confronted with such a choice, each end-host aspires to
commit to the path pi that will be selected by fewer other end-hosts,
i.e., the path pi with fpi (t0) < fp˜i (t0). In absence of inherent dier-
ences between the two choices, the only Nash equilibrium of such a
speculative game is given if every end-host commits to each path pi
with probability 1/2.
In expectation, the load on both paths α and β is thus E[fα (t0)] =
E[fβ (t0)] = 1/2. Since no migration occurs during the interval
[t0, t1), the load distribution is expected to remain equal during the
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interval, i.e., E[fα (t)] = E[fβ (t)] = 1/2 ∀t ∈ [t0, t1). When mecha-
nism enforcement ends at time t1, the end-hosts are again free to
arbitrarily select paths. However, since t0 +T < t1, any end-host
performing a re-evaluation after t1 perceives the Wardrop equilib-
rium cα (t−T ) = cβ (t−T ) and will thus not switch paths. Therefore,
the system is stable at equal load even when the mechanism is not
enforced anymore.
In reality, however, variance makes it likely that the load on
paths α and β is not perfectly equalized at t0. In that case, the FLOSS
mechanism attempts to eliminate the remaining load dierence
∆(t0) = | fα (t0) − fβ (t0)| > 0 as follows. Starting from t ′′ = t0 +T ,
the end-hosts can again register on paths for an upcoming interval
[t1, t2). At t ′′, all end-hosts correctly perceive the cost dierence
between a cheaper path pi and a more expensive path p˜i , as for every
path pi , cpˆi (t ′′ −T ) = cpˆi (t0) = cpˆi (t ′′) due to the constant load in
[t0, t ′′). The core idea of the FLOSS mechanism is to determine and
enforce a migration allowance ρpi (t1), which is an upper bound on
the amount of end-hosts that are allowed migrate from path p˜i to
path pi at time t1.
Importantly, ρpi (t1) is chosen such that
fpi (t0) + ρpi (t1) · fp˜i (t0) ≤ (1 − ρpi (t1)) · fp˜i (t0), (16)
which implies cpi (t1) ≤ cp˜i (t1) (i.e., the cheaper path pi will remain
the cheaper path in the next interval even if a share ρpi (t1) of end-
hosts on the more expensive path p˜i migrate to path pi ). This choice
of ρpi (t1) ensures the correct incentives for the end-hosts. Given
such an assurance, end-hosts registered on the cheaper path pi dur-
ing [t0, t1) minimize their cost by remaining on path pi . Since these
end-hosts are considered loyal to path pi , their registration at path pi
will be renewed for the upcoming interval [t1, t2). Conversely, all
end-hosts registered on the more expensive path p˜i would minimize
their cost by migrating to the cheaper path pi . However, the FLOSS
mechanism restricts this migration by only granting a registration
for pi to a share ρpi (t1) of end-hosts on p˜i . The non-migrating end-
hosts on path p˜i are considered loyal on path p˜i and are thus allowed
to renew their registration at p˜i .
Therefore, exactly ρpi (t1) · fp˜i (t0) migrate from path p˜i to path pi
at time t1, which reduces the dierence in load and cost between
the paths pi and p˜i . By repetitive mechanism application with ap-
propriately chosen migration allowances, the FLOSS mechanism
can arbitrarily minimize the cost dierential between the paths pi
and p˜i . When the cost dierence becomes so small that end-hosts
perceive a Wardrop equilibrium, the mechanism has achieved sta-
bility at equal load that continues to hold even without mechanism
enforcement.
5.3 PSS Equilibrium Analysis
We now prove Theorem 5.3, i.e., we show that path-selection strat-
egy σF is the optimal strategy for an end-host given that all other
end-hosts have adopted σF. Concretely, we show that the FLOSS
mechanism induces a PSS equilibrium v∗ = {σF 7→ 1}, where σF is
the universally adopted path-selection strategy with the following
path-selection function:
uF(pi , t |p˜i ) =

1/2 if t = t0,
1 if t > t0 and Ee (pi , t)
and cpi (t −T ) < cp˜i (t −T ),
0 otherwise
(17)
where Ee (pi , t) is true if and only if end-host e is entitled to use
path pi at time t . We assume that an end-host always knows whether
it is entitled to use a path. For the initial interval, every path is
selected with equal probability 1/2. For all subsequent intervals,
a path pi is selected if the path is perceived to be cheaper than
the current path p˜i and end-host e is entitled to use path pi . For
remaining on a path p˜i , it holds that uF(p˜i , t |p˜i ) = 1 − uF(pi , t |p˜i ).
The FLOSS mechanism makes strategy σF the equilibrium strat-
egy by imposing the additional cost cM (pi , t) for using path pi at
time t . End-host e incurs a cost ca for attempting to register and a
penalty cost cp for using a path without a registration. We assume
cp = ∞, i.e., the penalty cost makes a path unusable. LetAe (pi , t) be
true if and only if end-host e applies to register for using path pi at
time t and letRe (pi , t) be true if and only if end-host e obtained a reg-
istration for using path pi at time t , i.e., Re (pi , t) = Ae (pi , t)∧Ee (pi , t).
Using these predicates, the cost imposed by the FLOSS mechanism
can be expressed as
cM (pi , t |Ae ,Re ) = [Ae (pi , t)] · ca + [¬Re (pi , t)] · cp, (18)
where [P] = 1 if the predicate P is true and 0 otherwise.
A selsh end-host e chooses its actions such that its cost from
the mechanism is minimized. Therefore, an end-host e requests a
registration if and only if the end-host is entitled to the registration,
as there is no benet of a registration request that will be refused.
Thus the relevant mechanism-imposed cost for end-host e is
cM (pi , t) = minAe ,Re cM (pi , t |Ae ,Re ) =
{
ca if Ee (pi , t),
cp otherwise.
(19)
Concerning the initial interval with start t0, both paths α and β
have expected cost cpi (t0) = 1/2p if all other end-hosts choose each
path with probabilityuF(pi , t |p˜i ) = 1/2. As both paths have the same
cost and both paths require a registration, the usage cost of both
paths is cMu (pi , t0) = 1/2p + ca. Independent of the current path p˜i ,
the cost of applying strategy σF at time t0 is thus cM (σF, t0 |p˜i ) =
1/2p + ca for any choice of u(pi , t0 |p˜i ). Therefore, end-host e cannot
reduce its cost by choosing another path-selection probability than
uF(pi , t0 |p˜i ) = 1/2, which makes σF an equilibrium strategy for the
initial interval.
Concerning subsequent intervals with start ti > t0, we have
to distinguish two cases for the current path pi ′ of end-host e ,
namely whether end-host e is on the cheaper path pi or on the
more expensive path p˜i .3
(1) If end-host e is on the cheaper path pi , the cost of remaining
on pi is cMu (pi , ti ) = cpi (ti )+ ca, whereas the cost of switch-
ing to p˜i is cMu (p˜i , ti ) = cp˜i (ti )+ca if Ee (p˜i , ti ) and cp˜i (ti )+cp
otherwise. As always cMu (pi , ti ) < cMu (p˜i , ti ), the current
3Thanks to the load being constant in subsequent intervals, the cost cpˆi (t ) of a path
pˆi at registration time t is equal to the known stale cost cpˆi (t − T ). Therefore, any
end-host can correctly identify the cheaper and the more expensive path.
7
IFIP Performance, November 2–6, 2020, Milano, Italy Simon Scherrer, Markus Legner, Adrian Perrig, and Stefan Schmid
path pi must be selected with probability u(pi , t |pi ) = 1 to
minimize the end-host’s cost.
(2) If end-host e is on the more expensive path p˜i , the cost of
remaining on p˜i is cMu (p˜i , ti ) = cp˜i (ti ) + ca, whereas the
cost of switching to pi is cMu (pi , ti ) = cpi (ti )+ ca if Ee (pi , ti )
and cpi (ti ) + cp otherwise. Thus, cMu (pi , ti ) < cMu (p˜i , ti )
if Ee (pi , ti ), but cMu (p˜i , ti ) < cMu (pi , ti ) otherwise. If end-
host e is entitled to use the cheaper path pi , the cheaper
path pi must thus be selected with probability u(pi , t |p˜i ) = 1
to minimize the end-host’s cost, and with probability 0
otherwise.
In summary, for all intervals with start ti > t0, an end-host e
optimizes its cost by switching to an alternative path pi if and only
if path pi is cheaper than the current path p˜i and end-host e is
entitled to use path pi . This path-switching behavior is exactly
captured by the path-selection function uF(pi , t |p˜i ). Therefore, path-
selection strategy σF is an equilibrium strategy for both the initial
interval and the subsequent intervals of the mechanism, which
proves Theorem 5.3.
6 THE CROSS MECHANISM
In this section, we present a second stabilization mechanism called
CROSS (Computation-Requiring Oscillation Suppression System).
6.1 Overview
While the FLOSS mechanism (cf. §5) deterministically achieves sta-
bility at equal load, its strict enforcement of the migration allowance
represents a problem in case of path failures. When a path fails, an
end-host on that path is not allowed to switch to an alternative path
immediately. Only when the path failure is detected after some time
by the mechanism, enforcement of the mechanism can be stopped
and the end-hosts can be allowed to use an alternative path. For
highly critical transmissions, such inexibility is undesirable.
The CROSS mechanism allows end-hosts to obtain an insurance
against such cases of path failure. Basically, the CROSS mechanism
works similarly to the initial interval of the FLOSS mechanism: End-
hosts are required to register for one path of their choice, which in
general cannot be changed during the upcoming interval. Unlike
FLOSS, however, the CROSS mechanism oers the possibility of
registration for a second path that can be immediately used in case
of a path failure, even if the path failure is not yet veried.
However, the question is how to avoid that end-hosts always
register for both paths and, if on the more expensive path, falsely
claim to be aected by a path failure and switch to the cheaper
path. Such opportunistic behavior would cause oscillation. To
solve this problem, the idea of the CROSS mechanism is that end-
hosts must prove that they need the immediate-switching option
for insurance against path failures, not simply for opportunistic
cost reduction. End-hosts can prove their truthfulness by paying a
price for the immediate-switch option. This price must be higher
than any cost gain that can be achieved by switching to a cheaper
path in a scenario without path failure. An end-host that paid this
price thus only switches to the backup path if a path failure has
occurred; if no path failure occurred, the end-host would not trade
its insurance option against the cost gain, as the insurance option
is more valuable to the end-host than any cost gain. Immediate
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
t
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
f pi
(t
)
t′
I0
t0
I1
t1
I2
t2
fα
fβ
Figure 4: Simulation of CROSS enforcement in an
oscillation-prone system O = (Π = {α , β}, r = 1,p =
1,T = 2,A0 = 1,v = {σC 7→ 1}), with ϵ = 0.01.
switching during the interval can thus be allowed to the end-hosts
with a backup-path registration. Moreover, immediate switching
behavior by those end-hosts is an indication of path failure, which
means that all other end-hosts must be allowed to migrate as well.
As a price for the backup path registration, the CROSS mecha-
nism requires the solution to a computationally hard puzzle. This
puzzle is structured such that only end-hosts with a suciently high
valuation of the backup path will obtain a solution. More precisely,
each puzzle E is associated with a cryptographic hash function
h : {0, 1}∗ 7→ [0, 1] and a diculty level δ ≥ 0. An end-host e can
solve a puzzle E(pi ) for registering at a backup path pi by nding a
value s such that h(pi , ti , e, s) ≤ 2−δ , where ti is the start of the next
balancing trial. Given a cryptographic hash function, a puzzle E(pi )
can only be solved by brute force, i.e., varying s in a series of hash
computations. By nding an appropriate s , an end-host can obtain
a backup-path registration.
Also unlike FLOSS, the CROSS mechanism allows end-hosts to
register at a path of their choice not only for the initial interval,
but for every interval. Therefore, even if the path failure is not
detected for some reason (e.g., because no end-host obtained a
backup registration), the end-host can use the alternative path in
the interval after a path failure. The CROSS mechanism thus has
a non-deterministic approach for achieving stability: Intervals in
CROSS serve as balancing trials and are repeated until the load
imbalance is small enough that end-hosts do not switch paths any-
more. Since the end-hosts select each path with probability 1/2 in
any balancing trial, the probability that an approximately equal load
distribution results after a few balancing trials is substantial. Still,
the additional exibility of CROSS results in a loss of convergence
guarantees: Instead of convergence to an equal-load distribution,
the CROSS mechanism only guarantees convergence to a trac
distribution with approximately equal load. A simulation of CROSS
enforcement is visualized in Figure 4, which also shows the conver-
gence produced by the CROSS approach.
Theorem 6.1. The CROSS mechanism is an incentive-compatible
stabilization mechanism that achieves stability at approximately
equal load, i.e., for every ϵ > 0, limt→∞ ∆(t) < ϵ .
The CROSS mechanism achieves stability at approximately equal
load by incentivizing the universal adoption of path-selection strat-
egy σC, which prescribes that end-hosts only use a path if they
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have a corresponding registration and only use a backup in case
of path failures. More formally, Theorem 6.1 directly follows from
Theorems 6.2 and 6.3:
Lemma 6.2. Universal adoption of the CROSS path-selection strat-
egy σC leads to stability at approximately equal load.
Lemma 6.3. Universal adoption of the CROSS path-selection strat-
egy σC represents a PSS equilibrium given enforcement of the CROSS
mechanism.
While the proof of Theorem 6.2 is intuitive and can thus be found
in Appendix E, Theorem 6.3 is proven below.
6.2 PSS Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we prove Theorem 6.3 by showing that universal
adoption of path-selection strategy σC is a PSS equilibrium, i.e., if
all other end-hosts adopt σC, σC is the optimal strategy for a single
end-host e . The path-selection strategy σC is characterized by the
following path-selection function for pi , p˜i :
uC(pi , t |p˜i ) =

1/2 if t = ti ∧ ¬R′e (pi , t),
1 if cp˜i (t −T ) = ∞∧ R′e (pi , t),
0 otherwise,
(20)
where ti is the start time of any balancing trial, cp˜i (t − T ) = ∞
designates a path failure and R′e (pi , t) is true if and only if end-
host e has a backup registration for path pi at time t . Moreover,
uC(p˜i , t |p˜i ) = 1 − uC(pi , t |p˜i ).
As in FLOSS, registering has cost ca, whereas using a path with-
out registration imposes a penalty cost cp = ∞. Additionally, an
end-host incurs cost by solving puzzles, where each hashing opera-
tion has cost ch. To an end-host with valuation ω of a backup path,
a hash operation has the expected utility E[Uh](δ ,ω) = 2−δω − ch.
Given puzzle-diculty level δ , an end-host thus solves a puzzle
if and only if it has a backup valuation ω such that E[Uh](δ ,ω) > 0.
If an end-host does not solve a puzzle, it simply obtains a regular
registration for one path at cost ca, where every path is selected
with probability 1/2. Obtaining no registration and using any path
would incur a much higher penalty cost cp  ca and is thus not
rational. Therefore, an end-host with a registration for one path
uses this path from the start ti of the balancing trial. If an end-host
solves a puzzle, the end-host obtains a backup registration for the
path corresponding to the puzzle and obtains a regular registration
for the other path at cost ca. Since CROSS enforces that an end-
host can only switch once to its backup path and never switch
back during the balancing trial, every end-host with a backup-path
registration starts by using the path with its regular registration
at time ti . In summary, the optimal path-selection function for all
t = ti is uC(pi , t |pi ′) = 1/2 if ¬R′e (pi , t).
During the balancing trial, no reallocation decisions are taken
before ti +T , as the expected path costs during [ti , ti +T ] is E[cα ] =
E[cβ ] = 1/2p . Only at ti +T , the actual imbalance ∆(t) = | fpi (ti ) −
fp˜i (ti )| between a more expensive path p˜i and a cheaper path pi
becomes visible to the end-hosts. If the end-hosts on path p˜i with a
backup registration for path pi switched at that point, they would
save ∆C =
∫ ti+1
ti+T
(cp˜i (t) − cpi (t)) dt , which is bounded above by
∆Cmax = ti+1 − ti − T . However, such a switch would erase the
backup value ω of path pi for the end-host, which is why an end-
host with backup registration for path pi only switches to path pi if
ω < ∆C . In order to disincentivize such migration and keep the load
distribution constant, the CROSS mechanism chooses the puzzle-
diculty level δ such that E[Uh](δ ,v) > 0 if and only ifω > ∆Cmax.
This choice of δ leads to a situation where the end-hosts with a
backup registration will only switch to the backup path in case of
a path failure, as these end-hosts value the backup option higher
than any cost reduction obtainable without path failure. In case of a
path failure, however, trading the backup value ω of path pi against
the innite cost of failed path p˜i is rational and the end-hosts with
a backup registration switch the paths. In summary, the optimal
path-selection function for end-host e and for all t , ti is thus
uC(pi , t |p˜i ) = 1 if R′e (pi , t) and cp˜i (t − T ) = ∞, and uC(pi , t |p˜i ) = 0
otherwise. Thereby, path-selection strategyσC has been established
as the PSS equilibrium strategy.
7 PRACTICAL APPLICATION
While the focus of this paper is on the theoretical exploration of
selsh path selection and stabilization mechanisms, this section lays
out a pathway toward practical application of our ndings. First,
we discuss practical requirements for inter-domain stabilization
mechanisms in §7.1. In §7.2, we present a mechanism-enforcement
architecture that conforms to these requirements. In §7.3 and §7.4,
we outline how the FLOSS and CROSS mechanisms could be prac-
tically implemented.
7.1 Requirements
If a stabilization mechanism is to be practically applied by network
operators in an inter-domain architecture, the mechanism must
conform to the following requirements:
(1) Limited overhead: The stabilization mechanism must only
induce a small overhead on the systems of network op-
erators. In particular, the genuine function of AS border
routers (forwarding trac at line rate) must not be compro-
mised by expensive mechanism-enforcement tasks. Note
that both mechanisms only need to be enforced by routers
in case of oscillation and until stabilization is achieved;
however, the mechanisms should induce little overhead
even during this short time span.
(2) No explicit inter-AS coordination (coordination-freeness):
The stabilization mechanism must not rely on explicit inter-
AS coordination. Such explicit coordination may not be
feasible or scalable, as the domains that perceive the same
oscillation pattern may be mutually unknown, mutually
distrusted, or very distant from each other.
7.2 Mechanism-Enforcement Architecture
To enforce a stabilization mechanism, an AS operator needs the
means to detect, inform, and punish the selsh entities that employ
an oscillatory path-selection strategy. In this section, we describe a
mechanism-enforcement architecture that provides these means to
an AS operator while conforming to the requirements in §7.1.
From an inter-domain perspective, the most important archi-
tectural question is the question of coordination, i.e., how each AS
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Figure 5: Oscillation patterns.
perceiving an oscillation pattern contributes to oscillation suppres-
sion. As explicit inter-AS coordination is undesirable, an implicit
method for responsibility assignment is necessary.
We leverage a fundamental property of paths in inter-domain
network graphs as a natural way to assign responsibility for inter-
domain oscillation suppression. This fundamental property is based
on the following insight: For every pair of paths connecting the
same origin and destination ASes, there is at least one AS (hence-
forth: the splitting AS) in which the paths split, i.e., the paths contain
dierent egress interfaces out of the AS. For every oscillation be-
tween two paths, there is thus at least one AS which perceives
the oscillation as an oscillation of trac between egress interfaces,
not only as periodic upswings and downswings in the load at one
egress interface. Such splitting ASes are the natural candidates
for a leading role in inter-domain oscillation suppression, as these
ASes are both best informed about the oscillation and in the best
position to manage the oscillating trac.
For illustration of the path-splitting property, Figure 5 shows
dierent types of oscillation patterns for paths connecting an origin
end-host O and a destination end-host D. In the simplest cases, the
oscillation may be perceived at the origin AS (AS A1 in Figure 5a)
or at one intermediate AS (AS A1 in Figure 5b). However, the oscil-
lation may be perceived at multiple splitting ASes. The dierent
paths may pass through a dierent number of egress interfaces
at which the mechanism is enforced. For example, path pi3 in Fig-
ure 5c only passes through one critical egress interface (at AS A0),
whereas paths pi1 and pi2 pass through two critical egress interfaces.
Conversely, each path in Figure 5d passes through two egress in-
terfaces at which a load-balancing mechanism is enforced. Any
stabilization mechanism may thus be applied repeatedly and with
dierent frequency to ows belonging to the same oscillation-prone
system.
In the intra-domain context, the mechanism-enforcement ar-
chitecture envisages a centralized oscillation-suppression service
(OSS) in each AS. The OSS is capable of interacting with the border
routers at the egress interfaces. For a splitting AS, this OSS func-
tions as displayed in Figure 6. By collecting aggregate load statistics
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Figure 6: Mechanism-enforcement architecture (within the
splitting AS).
from the border routers, the OSS in the splitting AS can identify
the egress interfaces between which oscillation occurs (through
correlation). As the presence of such oscillation means that the
AS is obliged to enforce a stabilization mechanism, the OSS equips
every oscillation-perceiving border router ri with data Mi that is
necessary to enforce the mechanism (e.g., start time of the next
interval). By further collecting load statistics from the egresses, the
OSS monitors and continuously adapts the execution of the mech-
anism. The border routers communicate with the origins of the
oscillating ows by appending mechanism-relevant information to
passing packets.
7.3 FLOSS in Practice
In the following, we discuss how the FLOSS mechanism could
be applied by the mechanism-enforcement architecture from §7.2,
while conforming to the practicality requirements laid out in §7.1,
namely limited overhead and coordination-freeness.
7.3.1 Limited Overhead.
Registration on routers. In order to signal that end-hosts must
register for an upcoming time interval, a border router appends the
start time ti of the next interval to passing packets. If an end-host
witnesses such a call for registrations in its packets, it can send
a packet with a registration request over the desired egress. A
border router can keep track of registrations using a Bloom lter,
which approximates a set of ow IDs. A Bloom lter oers constant
complexity for both lookup and insertion, although suering from
false positives. When checking for registrations, false positives
result in unregistered ows being able to send over an egress and
being rewarded like loyal ows. However, the enforced migration
rate ρ can simply be discounted by the false-positive rate of the
Bloom lter such that the desired migration rate is enforced despite
the presence of lucky unregistered ows.
Enforcement of single registration. In order to avoid that an end-
host registers on multiple egresses, a border router forwards all
registrations to the OSS, which keeps track of egress-specic reg-
istration by ows and can therefore spot multiple registrations
by the same ow. If multiple registrations are detected, the OSS
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pushes a blacklist update for the malicious ow ID to the border
routers. In order to avoid introducing DoS attacks where a mali-
cious actor provokes the blacklisting of an end-host by sending
multiple registrations, we assume some form of lightweight source
authentication, which is typically oered by path-aware Internet
architectures [31].
Selective admission of migrating ows. Border routers need an
ecient way to decide whether to grant registration applications to
ows that are willing to switch paths, while preserving the property
that a maximum share ρ of ows migrates. Such selective admis-
sion can be implemented using a publicly know hash function h,
which maps the ow ID f to the interval [0, 1]. If h(ti | f ) < ρ, the
registration is granted, where ti is the beginning time of the next
registration-enforcement interval. This construction has the advan-
tage that an end-host can locally check whether it will be accepted
on the alternative ingress, as h, ti , and f are known to the end-host.
Therefore, the border router is not bothered by registration requests
from end-hosts that would be rejected. Furthermore, it is important
to choose the ow ID f based on attributes that the source end-host
cannot easily inuence without compromising its communication,
e.g., source and destination IP, but not source or destination port.
Small trac allowance for unregistered ows. While unregistered
end-hosts should not be able to properly use an egress, these end-
hosts should be able to send a few packets over the egress to measure
the latency of the corresponding path. Also, short ows, e.g., DNS
requests, should not be required to obtain a registration. Such a
limited trac allowance can be eciently achieved by applying
the mechanism only to a subset of packets, e.g., by sub-sampling. If
registrations are only checked for a sub-set of packets, even an un-
registered ow has a high chance of getting a few packets through
the egress, while still experiencing severe disruption when sending
a large number of packets over the egress. Due to the structure
of congestion-control algorithms, sub-sampling rates as low as 1%
already cause enough packet drops to make a path completely un-
usable for unregistered ows [24]. Moreover, sub-sampling reduces
the workload on border routers.
Addition of new ows. In reality, new ows appear during the
execution of the mechanism. Clearly, these ows cannot register
in advance for an enforcement interval, as these ows do not exist
beforehand. Therefore, new ows are also allowed to register at
one path of their choice during an enforcement interval. In order
to distinguish new ows from ows that merely pretend to be new,
the FLOSS mechanism samples the active ows at both egresses in
every interval and inserts them into a Bloom lter. These previously
active ows are supposed to have a registration in the subsequent
interval. In contrast, truly new ows can be identied with a lookup
failure in the mentioned Bloom lter. Due to false positives, a truly
new ow might be mistaken for a previously active ow and thus
be denied a retroactive registration. However, given a small false-
positive probability, the probability that such a mistake appears at
multiple egresses is negligible such that registration at one path
should always be possible in practice. As all new ows (except
the false-positive new ows) during an interval must be expected
to ock to the cheaper path, the migration allowance must be
discounted by the birth rate of ows.
7.3.2 Coordination-Freeness. If there is one splitting AS for an
oscillation-prone system, there are no unintended eects due to
distributed application of the mechanism. However, as explained in
§7.2, there may be multiple mechanism-enforcing ASes along a path.
If ni is the number of splitting ASes along path pii , the costs for ob-
taining a registration for pii and for using pii without a registration
are ni · ca and ni · cp, respectively. In cases where ni is the same
for every path pii of an oscillation pattern (such as in Figure 5d),
the incentives for the end-hosts thus do not change compared to a
single-application scenario. However, if ni is dierent for the paths
pii in the oscillation-prone system (such as in Figure 5c), the regis-
tration cost for dierent paths may be dierent. For example, the
registration cost for obtaining a registration of path pi3 in Figure 5c
is ca, whereas the corresponding cost for paths pi1 and pi2 is 2ca.
Since cp = ∞ > nica for all nite ni , registering for a path is still
worthwhile. However, an equilibrium between the two egresses
of AS A0 is only reached if (fpi1 + fpi2 )p + 2ca = f ppi3 + ca, which
implies stability at unequal load. However, since the cost ca for
obtaining a registration is modest (just a single packet as explained
in §7.3.1), the resulting load imbalance between the ASes is also
modest. Therefore, no explicit inter-AS coordination is needed.
7.4 CROSS in Practice
In this section, we discuss the CROSS mechanism with respect to
the two practicality requirements.
7.4.1 Limited Overhead. Compared to FLOSS, the only addi-
tional piece of functionality needed for CROSS is puzzle veri-
cation. Ecient puzzle-solution verication on border routers is
performed by a hash function evaluation with the appropriate ar-
guments, among which is the solution value provided by the data
packet (cf. §6.2).
7.4.2 Coordination-Freeness. Like FLOSS, CROSS suers from
the minor issue that some paths may require more registrations than
other paths. Concerning backup registrations, multiple applications
of the mechanism do not constitute a problem, as an end-host
always has to solve only one puzzle to obtain a backup registration.
For example, an end-host in the network of Figure 5c could insure
against path failure as follows. At ASA0, the end-host would obtain
a normal registration for pi3 and a backup registration for pi1 and pi2.
Such a combined backup registration is possible by including only
the respective egress of ASA0 in the puzzle solution, not the specic
path. At AS A1, the end-host can then obtain a normal registration
for one of these paths, e.g., pi1. If the end-host desires an additional
insurance against failure of path pi1, the end-host can solve a puzzle
to obtain a backup registration for pi2 at AS A1. Since only one
puzzle per backup path is needed, no explicit inter-AS coordination
is necessary to preserve the incentives of the CROSS mechanism.
8 RELATEDWORK
Prior research has devised trac-engineering tools to improve net-
work stability. However, due to the traditional paradigm of network-
controlled path selection, most tools assume that packet forwarding
is performed by series of decisions taken by the hops along a path.
Systems such as AMP [17], ReplEx [11], Homeostasis [23], and
HALO [25] thus prescribe how routers along a path should take
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forwarding decisions, mostly by adapting trac-splitting ratios
based on network information. If packets must be forwarded along
a path chosen by the end-host, these schemes cannot be used.
An alternative line of work is generally compatible with the
emerging paradigm of end-point path selection. Assuming source
routing, this avor of research prescribes path-selection strategies
that lead to convergence. However, such convergent path-selection
strategies are always designed for an intra-domain context, i.e., for
path selection within a domain where end-points are under control
of the network operator. Due to the selshness of end-hosts in
the inter-domain context, these schemes are thus impractical. For
example, Proportional Sticky Routing [27] relies on self-restraint of
end-points, which leads to persistent preference of shortest paths
over alternative paths even when alternative paths are more at-
tractive. The convergence of MATE [7] and the rerouting strategy
designed by Kelly and Voice [22] is built on the assumption that the
end-points restrain themselves to a maximum speed when reallocat-
ing trac on cheaper paths, which cannot be expected from selsh
end-hosts. In TeXCP [21], end-points are expected to comply with
maximum trac-reallocation allowances dynamically set by the
network. Similarly, the rerouting policies designed by Fischer and
Vöcking [14] require that end-hosts do not exceed a certain probabil-
ity for switching to a cheaper path. Finally, OPS [20] also demands
behavior from end-hosts that is irrational in a game-theoretic sense,
in particular the probabilistic usage of sub-optimal paths.
Inter-domain trac engineering by means of incentives has only
been studied in context of the BGP ecosystem, thus not accounting
for path choice by end-hosts. Given rational ASes, there are dier-
ent methods to achieve stability for inter-domain trac: incentive-
compatible yet oscillation-free BGP policies [9, 39], egress-router se-
lection under QoS constraints [18], cooperative trac-engineering
agreements between ASes reached by Nash bargaining [36], and
the use of prices as trac-steering incentives [26].
9 CONCLUSION
In this work, we have set up a game-theoretic framework that allows
to test path-selection strategies on their viability for selsh end-
hosts, i.e., to show whether it is rational for an end-host to adopt
a path-selection strategy, given that all other end-hosts use said
path-selection strategy. Only strategies that form such equilibria
may be adopted in an Internet environment, where end-hosts are
self-interested and uncontrolled.
Using this framework, we have shown that the non-oscillatory
path-selection strategies traditionally proposed in the literature are
not rational strategies and thus cannot be expected to be adopted by
selsh, unrestricted end-hosts. This insight suggests that end-hosts
must be incentivized to abstain from oscillatory path selection
by means of stabilization mechanisms. We have designed two
stabilization mechanisms and proved their incentive compatibility.
We understand our work as a rst step and we believe that it
opens several interesting avenues for future research. In partic-
ular, it would be interesting to quantify the cost of oscillation to
a network and to investigate its relationship to the network type.
Comparing the oscillation cost to the overhead of stabilization
mechanisms would then allow to characterize the conditions under
which the employment of stabilization mechanisms is appropriate.
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A EXAMPLE OF STABILITY
The oscillation-prone system from Section 2.3 is stable if a sucient
number of end-hosts anticipate the greedy strategy σg with an an-
tagonist strategy σa. An end-host adopting the antagonist strategy
always selects the path with the higher perceived cost, speculat-
ing that the seemingly cheaper path will soon be overloaded by
greedy-strategy players:
ua(pi , t | p˜i ) =
{
1 if cpi (t −T ) > cp˜i (t −T )
0 otherwise
(21)
Conversely, ua(p˜i , t | p˜i ) = 1 − ua(pi , t | p˜i ).
In an oscillation-prone system with strategy prole v = {σg 7→
q,σa 7→ 1 − q} and initial imbalance A0 > 1/2, the initial dynamics
of the system are
fα (t) = (A0 + q − 1)e−r t + (1 − q). (22)
For q ≤ 1/2, we see that fα (t) > fβ (t) for all t ≥ 0, since
limt→∞ fα (t) = 1 − q ≥ 1/2, fα (0) = A0 > 1/2, and fα (t) is
monotonic. Using the denitions from §2.1, the oscillation-prone
system is stable with ∆∗ = 1 − 2q for all q < 1/2 and is stable at
equal load for q = 1/2.
B EXAMPLE OF PSS EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we illustrate the calculation of strategy costs of
the form set out in §2.4 by investigating whether the strategies
described in Appendix A form PSS equilibria. Proving that a strat-
egy prole is not a PSS equilibrium amounts to nding a deviant
strategy that reduces an end-host’s cost. Indeed, there exist such
deviant strategies for the strategy prole v with v(σg) = q and
v(σa) = 1 − q for all q ∈ [0, 1].
For the case q ≤ 1/2, there is no inversion of link costs and a
deviant agent can always assume that fpi (t) > fp˜i (t) if the agent
perceives fpi (t − T ) > fp˜i (t − T ). The best strategy given such a
strategy prole thus consists of switching to the cheaper path p˜i in
a deterministic and immediate fashion, as in the greedy strategy
σg presented in §2.3. Every delay of switching simply translates
into more time needlessly spent on a strictly more expensive path.
As the greedy strategy σg allows an end-host to reduce its cost,
v(σg) would quickly rise from q as more end-hosts adopt this strat-
egy. Therefore, any strategy prole with q ≤ 1/2 is not a PSS
equilibrium.
For q > 1/2, the periodic dynamics are structured as
fα (t) =
{
(A + q − 1) · e−r t ′ + 1 − q if t+(t )W is even,
−(A + q − 1) · e−r t ′ + q otherwise, (23)
where t ′ = t − t+(t),
W =
ln(2erT − 1)
r
, and A =
(
1
2 − q
)
e−rT + q. (24)
For showing that the antagonist strategyσa allows an end-host to
improve its cost if q ∈ (1/2, 1], we construct a mixed strategy σp(q′).
This strategy σp(q′) plays the greedy strategy σg with probability q′
and the antagonist strategy σa with probability 1−q′. We show that
an end-host minimizes its cost by choosingq′ = 0 givenq ∈ (1/2, 1] ,
i.e, the antagonist strategy σp(0) = σa is the better strategy than
the greedy strategy σp(1) = σg.
As mentioned in §2.4, the cost of a strategy in periodic oscillat-
ing systems is computed over a single periodic interval. For the
dynamics above, it is even sucient to calculate the strategy cost
between two turning points t+0 and t
+
1 , as the costs of the paths α
and β would simply be reversed in the subsequent turning-point
interval. Without loss of generality, we thus operate on a turning-
point interval [t+0 , t+1 ] during which path α is perceived to be the
cheaper path and fα (t+0 ) < fβ (t+0 ).
The time-dependent strategy cost C(σp (q′), t) for the deviant
agent is calculated based on a linear combination of the two path
costs, weighted by q′:
C(σp (q′), t) = 1
R
∫ t+R
t
[
q′ · cα (s) + (1 − q′) · cβ (s)
]
ds (25)
We further assume R ≤W , as any choice of higher R forces an agent
to select a path that is sub-optimal during at least time R−W . Using
this limitation, it is possible to derive a formula for the strategy
cost C(σp (q′)|O) that is a linear function of q′,
C(σp (q′)|O) =m · q′ + γ (26)
where γ is constant w.r.t. q′ and the slopem is
R
[(2q − 1)(W − R) + 2ar (e−rW + 1)] + 4ar 2 (e−rR − 1)
RW
(27)
using the abbreviation a = A+q − 1. The cost function steepness is
assumed to be p = 1, as the integral in Equation (25) is not tractable
otherwise.
The slope m can be shown to be positive for all R > 0, r ∈
[0, 1], and T ≥ T (R), where T (R) is such that W = R. Showing
this property is feasible in a two-step proof, where we rst show
m(T ) > 0 for T = T (R) and ∂/∂T m(T ) > 0 for all T > T (R). The
positiveness of m implies that the minimum of the strategy cost
C(σp (q′)|O) is achieved for q′ = 0, i.e., the antagonist strategy σa.
Given a strategy prole with q > 1/2, the adoption rate q of
the greedy strategy would thus quickly decrease in favor of the
antagonist strategyσa. Therefore, no strategy prolev withq > 1/2
represents a PSS equilibrium.
C PROOF OF OBSERVATION ??
We can numerically show that there exist oscillation-prone sys-
tems where the greedy strategy σg ensures a lower cost than an
underdamped convergent strategy σc. In fact, the oscillation-prone
system O assumed in Figure 2 is such an oscillation-prone system
where the strategy σc in an underdamped fashion does not yield
the optimal cost. Using the denition of strategy cost introduced
in §2.4, we calculate both C(σc |O) and C(σg |O).
In the calculation ofC(σc |O), we choose u(pi , t | pit ) as dened in
Equation (11). Furthermore, we can assume that y(pit |t) = fpit (t),
because an agent applying strategy σc allocates its trac in accor-
dance with all other agents and its probability distribution of being
on a certain path is equivalent to the general trac distribution
over the paths. As for the calculation of C(σg |O), we know that
u(pi , t | p˜i ) =
{
1 if cpi (t −T ) < cp˜i (t −T ),
0 otherwise,
(28)
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Figure 7: Example calculation illustrating that under-
damped convergent strategy σc may be an inferior strategy
(Environment: Oscillation-prone system O = ({α , β}, r =
1,p = 1,T = 2,A0 = 1,v = {σc 7→ 1})).
and
y(pi |t) =
{
1 if cpi (t −T ) = minpi ′ cpi ′(t −T ),
0 otherwise.
(29)
In Figure 7, the comparison of strategy costs for σc and σg are
shown for all R ∈ [0, 1] and the mentioned oscillation-prone sys-
tem O . Clearly, given the oscillation-prone system O where agents
universally apply an underdamped convergent strategy σc, any
single agent would have an incentive to switch to a greedy strategy
σc. The underdamped convergent strategy σc is thus not a PSS
equilibrium.
D PROOF OF OBSERVATION ??
The ow-allocation vector F∼ before projection is given by (using
the abbreviation fpi for fpi (t −T ))
F∼ =
(
Fα − γ · cα
Fβ − γ · cβ
)
. (30)
The projection on the feasible allocation set is the intersection of
the line describing the feasible set F ′β = d − F ′α and the line through
F∼ which is orthogonal to the feasibility line:
F ′β = F
′
α +
(
Fβ − Fα − γ (cβ − cα )
)
(31)
This intersection is at F ′α = 1/2 ·
(
d − Fβ + Fα + γ (cβ − cα )
)
. The
change in an end-host’s ow on path α is thus
F ′α − Fα = γ/2 ·
(
cβ (t −T ) − cα (t −T )
)
. (32)
If path α appears to be the more expensive path, this change is per-
formed by the re-evaluating end-hosts on path α , and otherwise by
the re-evaluating end-hosts on path β . Multiplying by the number
of re-evaluating end-hosts thus yields the aggregate dynamics
∂ fα
∂t
=
{
r · γ2 · ∆(t −T ) · fα (t) if ∆(t −T ) ≤ 0
r · γ2 · ∆(t −T ) · fβ (t) otherwise
(33)
where ∆(t −T ) = cβ (t −T ) − cα (t −T ).
E CROSS STABILITY ANALYSIS
To prove Theorem 6.2, we show that stability at approximately equal
load arises given universal adoption of path-selection strategy σC,
i.e., end-hosts use a path if they have a registration for that path
and only use a backup path in case of a path failure.
For stability at approximately equal load with parameter ϵ , we
assume that an end-host does not reallocate trac at time t if the
imbalance between paths ∆(t −T ) = | fα (t −T ) − fβ (t −T )| is less
than ϵ and thus the perceived cost dierence is too small to justify
path migration. If the imbalance ∆(t) can be kept below ϵ for a
period of length T , i.e., ∆(t) < ϵ for all t ∈ [t˜ , t˜ +T ), there will be
no reallocation during the following interval [t˜ +T , t˜ + 2T ) and, by
extension, also none in all subsequent intervals.
In any balancing trial with start ti , there will result a trac im-
balance ∆(ti ) = | fα (ti ) − fβ (ti )|. This imbalance remains constant
during time [ti , ti +T ), as the end-hosts only perceive the imbal-
ance at time ti +T . Thus, if ∆(ti ) < ϵ , stability at approximately
equal load is reached and enforcement of the mechanism can be
suspended. However, if ∆(ti ) ≥ ϵ , stability is not achieved and the
balancing trials are repeated until ∆(ti ) < ϵ .
Since an end-host selects each path with probability 1/2, the
distribution of fα (ti ) on [0, 1] can be approximated with a normal
distribution N possessing mean µ = 1/2 and variance σ 2 that de-
pends on the number of end-hosts. If Φ(fα ) is the CDF of N , then
the probability that∆(ti ) < ϵ isp<ϵ = Φ((1+ϵ)/2)−Φ((1−ϵ)/2) > 0.
With an increasing number of balancing trials over time t , the prob-
ability that ∆(ti ) < ϵ goes to 1 for t →∞. Therefore, for t → ∞, it
also holds that ∆(t) < ϵ , which is stability at approximately equal
load. Theorem 6.2 thus holds.
Indeed, the CROSS mechanism eventually achieves stability at ap-
proximately equal load even without relying on the computational
puzzles mentioned in §6.1. However, it is desirable that oscillation
can already be avoided during the execution of the mechanism. In
particular, if a balancing trial fails and ∆(ti ) ≥ ϵ , no oscillation
should take place until the start of the next balancing trial, i.e.,
during time [ti +T , ti+1). If the imbalance ∆(ti ) becomes visible to
end-hosts at time ti +T , the end-hosts on path p˜i with a backup reg-
istration for path pi could migrate. However, since CROSS ensures
that an end-host with a backup registration only uses its backup
path in case of a path failure (see next section), no migration takes
place at all during [ti + T , ti+1). Therefore, in absence of a path
failure, the load distribution remains constant during the whole
duration [ti , ti+1) of a balancing trial.
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